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A B S T R A C T
Several countries have increased their legal minimum age for work in line with international conventions on
child labor. We evaluated the effect of increasing the legal minimum age for work on school attendance in 3 low-
and middle-income countries using difference-in-differences analyses. Increasing the legal minimum age for
work increased school attendance by 3.0 (0.2, 5.8) percentage-points in Malawi, and 2.0 (0.2, 3.6) percentage-
points in Colombia. In Malawi, we found a greater policy effect among girls compared to boys. In Colombia, the
poorest tercile experienced the greatest improvement in educational outcomes. We found no evidence of an
impact of increasing the legal minimum age for work on school attendance in Burkina Faso. Our findings suggest
that increasing the legal minimum age for work has had a positive effect on educational outcomes in some low
and middle income countries.
1. Introduction
The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that about
150 million children aged 5–17 years worldwide were engaged in work
which qualifies as child labor in 2016 (ILO, 2017). The ILO defines
child labor as “work that deprives children of their childhood, their
potential and dignity, and that is harmful to their physical and mental
development” (ILO, 2016). In line with the principles set out in the ILO
conventions on child labor (ILO Conventions 138 on the minimum age
for legal work, and 182 on the elimination of the worst forms of child
labor) (ILO, 2000, pp. 1–4; ILO, 1973, pp. 1–6), several countries have
enacted laws setting or increasing the legal minimum age for work
(henceforth LMAW).
Child work has been found in several studies to be negatively as-
sociated with school attendance and educational attainment (Heady,
2003; Khanam & Ross, 2011; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1995;
Psacharopoulos, 1997; Rosati & Rossi, 2003). Working children have
been shown to have higher school drop-out rates and to complete fewer
years of schooling overall. For example, Psacharaopoulos (1997) found
that Bolivian children in wage work completed nearly a year less
schooling and Venezuelan working children completed two fewer years
of schooling than their non-working counterparts (Psacharopoulos,
1997). Ray (2002) similarly found that among Ghanaian children,
educational attainment decreased by about a year for each additional
hour of wage work per week. However, these empirical associations do
not necessarily reflect true causal relationships for three reasons.
Firstly, they may suffer from reverse causation—i.e. children may work
because they have had to drop out of school for other reasons (house-
hold poverty, lack of access, poor quality of schools etc. (Huisman &
Smits, 2015; Lloyd, Mensch, & Clark, 2000). Secondly, these associa-
tions may be confounded by factors(such as socio-economic position),
which drive children to work and be out of school, and which are not
always adequately controlled for in these studies. Thirdly, while
working children have been shown to be less likely to complete school,
many children, especially those who work part time for family busi-
nesses or seasonally, are able to effectively combine work and school
(Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1995; Shafiq, 2007; Bhalotra & Heady,
2003; Coulombe & Canagarajah, 1999). The extra household income
from working may actually facilitate the child's schooling by relieving
all or part of the associated financial burden to the household
(Maconachie & Hilson, 2016 ).
It is thus unclear that interventions aimed at limiting child work
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T
would necessarily improve educational outcomes. To our knowledge,
this question remains unresolved in the context of low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). While previous studies have examined the
association between LMAW and secondary education rates at a national
level, no previous study has looked longitudinally at how changes in
LMAW affect individual outcomes (Heymann, Raub, & Cassola, 2013).
In this study, we contribute to filling this gap by evaluating the effect of
national legislation increasing the legal minimum age of work on school
attendance in 3 LMICs. As secondary objectives, we examine how these
effects vary by gender and socio-economic position.
1.1. Study context
We conducted our study using data from Burkina Faso, Colombia
and Malawi. In Burkina Faso, about 40% of children work, mostly in
agriculture (ILO, 2014). Others work in artisanal mineral mines, espe-
cially gold mines, and in domestic service. Child labor in Burkina Faso
is intricately linked with child trafficking. The country is both an origin
and destination as well as transit point for children being moved across
the sub-region to work in often hazardous conditions. Children are
brought to Burkina Faso from Nigeria and Mali, while children from
Burkina Faso end up in Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and
Mali (De Lange, 2007; Hounmenou, 2016). Burkina Faso has ratified
the ILO convention 182 in 1999 and has enacted several domestic po-
licies to protect children from hazardous work. It has also participated
in several international initiatives to combat child labor including the
ILO-IPEC LUTRENA project (ILO, 2019) funded by the US Department
of labor, and similar projects in collaboration with France and the
European Union. Since the adoption in 2007 of the Education Or-
ientation Law (AN Portant loi d'orientation de l'education., 2007),
schooling has been ostensibly free and compulsory up to age 16, but in
rea access to education is still dependent on the local availability of
schools and the household's ability to purchase school materials and
spare children from working on behalf of their families (EPDC, 2014).
In Malawi, it is estimated that between about 25% of children aged
5–14 years of age engaged in economic activity in 2014 (USDOL,
2016a). Many children are trafficked internally, the boys to work in
fishing, herding livestock, on tobacco farms as farm hands and street
vendors, and the girls as domestics and sex workers (Malawi, in Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2014, 2015). As of 2008, Malawi
had no compulsory education age but has provided free primary edu-
cation since 1994 (Kadzamira & Rose, 2003; National Education Sector
Plan 2008–2017, 2008; UNESCO, 2008). Child labor laws are enforced
through the Ministry of Labor. The government has in place several
policies and programs under the umbrella of the Child Protection Policy
embedded within Malawi's Growth and Development Strategy
2006–2011. These policies make the elimination of child labor a
priority (Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II, 2011- 2016.
Report No. 12/222, 2011).
In Colombia, about 10% of children work, mostly in the informal
sector (USDOL, 2016b). Most of them work in unpaid family farming
activities, illegal mineral mines, as domestic servants, as street vendors
and waiting tables. Some children are also involved in the drug trade. In
urban areas especially, some older children are exploited for commer-
cial sex work. There have been reports of trafficking of boys internally
for forced labor and girls abroad for sex work. Children in Colombia
have also been caught up in the country's decades old civil war, being
recruited by both warring factions as combatants and informants or
camp followers. Some of the girls are even used as “wives” for the
combatants (Oviedo-Trespalacios, Manjarrés, Maestre-Meyer,
Peñabaena-Niebles, & Holgado, 2013; Trabajo Infantil en Colombia,
2010). Children are required to attend school from ages 5 to 15 and
public schools are free (Borjas & Acosta, 2000). The Colombian con-
stitution prohibits the economic exploitation of children and protects
them from hazardous work as well as forced labor (Código de la
Infancia y la Adolescencia, Ley 1098 of 2006, 2006).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Data
We sourced data on changes in the legal minimum age of work from
the McGill Institute of Health and Social Policy's (IHSP) PROSPERED
Project's Child Labour Database (“PROSPERED Child Labor Policy
Database,” n.d .). This database contains data on the working condi-
tions and available legal protections for child workers in 122 countries.
The database expands on the University of California, Los Angeles'
(UCLA) WORLD Policy Analysis Center's database on child labour po-
licies (“UCLA WORLD Policy Center Child Labor Database,” n.d.) by
adding data from 1995 to 2012. It was coded from primary-source
documents obtained from multiple sources such as national labour
laws/codes, the ILO's NATLEX database and the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). The information extracted has been trans-
lated into a set of characteristics that can be quantitatively analyzed.
For example, for the purposes of this study, the coding involved ex-
tracting the legal minimum ages at which children were permitted to do
all work, light work or work with permission using information from
multiple legal and policy documents in which such information may not
be explicitly stated. This coding was done independently by two re-
searchers and the results harmonized according to rules set out sys-
tematically in a codebook.
We obtained information on educational outcomes from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (Corsi, Neuman, Finlay, &
Subramanian, 2012; ICF., n.d.). The DHS are repeated cross-sectional
surveys conducted in several countries using multistage sampling to
obtain nationally representative data on the demographic, socio-eco-
nomic, fertility and health characteristics of their populations. While
details vary from country to country, the surveys share standardized
data-gathering tools and procedures enabling data to be compared
across countries and surveys. The data is publicly available subject to
registration. The details of DHS survey years and sample sizes included
from each country are given in Table 2 below.
We included countries in this study if they had increased their legal
minimum age of work and conducted at least two DHS surveys before
the policy change and at least one afterwards. We further examined pre-
exposure trends as discussed below and excluded countries with non-
parallel pre-treatment trends in the outcome between treated and
control groups. Based on these criteria, we included 3 countries
(Burkina Faso, Colombia, Malawi) in our analysis. We used all available
DHS surveys for each selected country in our sample and excluded
observations with missing information on any covariate. Details of the
policy changes for each country are given in Table 4. Within each
country, we used data from all children aged from 12 to 17 years. We
chose this age range as representative of children in post-elementary/
secondary school. We repeated our analyses using children from ages
10 to 18 as a check on the sensitivity of our findings to the age range of
the children included. We present those results in the Table 5. As we
had very few missing data on our outcome and covariates across all
surveys, we excluded observations with missing data on outcome and
covariates from the analyses.
Abbreviations
DHS Demographic and Health Surveys
DiD Difference-in-Differences
IHSP Institute for Health and Social Policy
ILO International Labor Organization
LMAW Legal minimum age for work
LMIC Low- and middle-income countries
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2.2. Measures
The treatment was a change in the minimum age for legal work, as
stipulated in the country's law or implied by national policy, ignoring
any exceptions and/or special provisions for light work. Details of the
relevant legislation from the countries involved are provided in Table 4.
Within each country, we compared age groups whose ability to work
legally was altered by the policy change (henceforth, the “treated”
group) to those who remained unaffected by the policy change (the
“control” group). The age groups in our study were constructed from
serial cross-sectional surveys and do not represent longitudinal age
cohorts.
The outcome was school attendance, defined as having attended
school in the year preceding the interview (1= yes, 0= no). This is a
basic school participation indicator taken from the household surveys.
For each child in the study, the survey question asked whether the child
attended school in the previous year. This question was asked of all
children in the household without regard to enrollment status.
We modeled the interactions between our exposure, and gender and
socio-economic status in our analyses. For this purpose, we defined
gender as binary (male/female) and socio-economic status as terciles of
an asset-based wealth score estimated for each survey year and country.
The score was derived using a principal components analyses of asset
variables, as per the recommended DHS method (Rutstein S.O, 2015),
and categorized by terciles for analysis.
2.3. Statistical analysis
We used a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach (Donald & Lang,
2007; Lechner, 2011; Lee & Kang, 2006) to model the effect of changes
in the LMAW on school attendance within each country. DiD is a quasi-
experimental method, which estimates the causal effect of an inter-
vention as the change in an outcome comparing “treated” and “control”
groups, before and after an intervention. Under the identifying as-
sumption that treatment and control groups would experience parallel
time trends in the outcome in the absence of the policy change, this
approach eliminates time-invariant confounding (both measured and
unmeasured). The effect estimate from such a model can thus be in-
terpreted as the causal effect of the intervention assuming no residual
or time-varying confounding. Since we used serial cross-sectional sur-
veys within each country in this study, we included year fixed-effects
terms in our models to adjust for secular trends in the outcomes shared
across age groups and included age fixed-effects terms to account for
time-fixed differences in the outcomes between age groups.
As mentioned above, the validity of inferences from this analytical
method depends on the assumption of parallel trends—i.e. that the
difference in our outcomes between treated and control groups would
remain constant over time in the absence of the intervention and that
any shocks (with the exception of the intervention) would have a si-
milar effect on both treatment and control groups. This assumption is
unverifiable and likely to be violated if there are changes in other
factors affecting the outcome that coincide with the intervention. To
evaluate this assumption, we examined temporal trends in the outcome,
comparing treated and control children in the pre-intervention period.
To do this, we examined plots of the proportions of children attending
school by year for treatment and control groups. We also ran linear
regression models of the outcome with treatment group, year and the
interaction of treatment and year as covariates, and examined the
coefficient of the interaction term to see if it differed significantly from
the null.
In our primary analyses, we ran within-country linear regression
models of the outcome with the binary treatment variable (being in the
affected), an indicator of being in the post-intervention period, an in-
teraction between treatment and being in the post-intervention period,
gender, wealth, fixed effects terms for age and fixed effects terms for
year as covariates. We assessed the effect of increasing the LMAW on
Fig. 1. Trends in school attendance and other socio-economic factors by treatment, country and year.
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school attendance as the absolute change in the proportion of children
who attended school in the year preceding the survey year, comparing
treated and control age groups from the pre-to the post-intervention
periods.
The general model specification was:= + + + + + + +C age yearY T X X T i i ti i i i i it0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Here, Yit is the outcome for individual i; X is an indicator of being in
an age group affected by the policy. The terms and yeart represent the
age and survey year fixed effects terms, respectively. Covariates in-
cluded in the vector Ci were household wealth and child's gender as
categorical variables. The coefficient of the interaction term, 3, is the
DiD estimator in this model.
We explored heterogeneity of the policy effect by gender and socio-
economic position by including interaction terms between these po-
tential effect measure modifiers and treatment, pre-post indicator, in-
teraction term, age, and year. From these models, we estimated the
impact of the policy change within categories of gender and household
wealth, for each outcome.
We weighted all regression models with de-normalized sample
weights as per the DHS recommended method and accounted for
clustering at the level of the primary sampling unit for each survey
(Rutstein & Rojas, 2006). We used population estimates from the Po-
pulation Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs to generate the de-normalized sample weights as per the
DHS recommended method (United Nations: Department of Social and
Economic Affairs, 2013). All analyses were conducted in STATA 13
(StataCorp, 2013).
3. Results and discussion
The average age of children in our study was 13.5 years in Burkina
Faso, 13.9 years in Colombia and 13.5 years in Malawi. Approximately
50% of each sample was male. The countries in this study differed in
their school attendance rates across the study period. Only 36% of
children in Burkina Faso attended school in the year prior to each
survey, compared to more than 80% of children in Colombia and
Malawi. As seen in Fig. 1 the proportion of children attending school
generally increased in all countries over the study period. The pattern
of increase suggests that pre-intervention trends in the outcome were
parallel for treated and control groups in all countries included in our
analyses (See Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). This is supported by the fact that the
coefficients of the interaction terms between treatment status and the
year dummy variables in our pre-intervention models were essentially
null. Table 1 gives some background information on economic, edu-
cational and social contexts in these countries. Details of the surveys we
Table 1
Economic, educational and social contexts of study countries.
Sources: All education and educational expenditure data are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://uis.unesco.org/).All economic indices are from World
Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. All employment indices are from the International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database.
Data retrieved in November 2018. All child labor indices are from the International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data retrieved in November 2018.
Burkina Faso Colombia Malawi
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
Adjusted net enrollment rate, primary (% of primary school age children) 36.7 46.0 60.2 97.5 97.5 97.2 – 96.7 –
Adjusted net enrollment rate, primary, female (% of primary school age children) 30.4 40.7 57.7 97.5 97.7 97.0 – 98.4 –
Adjusted net enrollment rate, primary, male (% of primary school age children) 42.9 51.1 62.6 97.5 97.2 97.4 – 95.0 –
School enrollment, secondary (% net) – 11.4 16.5 – 64.1 78.8 29.6 22.3 27.5
Adolescents out of school (% of lower secondary school age) – 80.6 54.1 – 12.8 0.6 – 34.8 –
Children out of school (% of primary school age) 63.3 54.0 39.8 2.5 2.5 2.8 – 3.3 –
Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) – 4.4 3.9 3.5 4.0 4.8 5.2 – 3.5
Government expenditure on education, total (% of government expenditure) – 19.5 16.2 13.3 15.5 16.4 – – 12.5
Government expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita) – 33.3 18.1 12.1 15.5 15.7 11.4 – 5.1
Government expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per capita) – 20.8 20.6 13.1 14.5 15.2 25.5 – 15.0
Expenditure on primary education (% of government expenditure on education) – 71.2 60.3 44.6 47.4 35.9 52.8 – 34.8
Expenditure on secondary education (% of government expenditure on education) – 10.3 18.0 33.1 36.1 34.8 21.4 – 24.1
Expenditure on tertiary education (% of government expenditure on education) – 9.6 18.8 19.9 13.8 22.1 15.6 – 29.8
GDP growth (annual %) 1.8 8.7 5.4 2.9 4.7 4.3 1.6 3.3 6.9
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 434.8 512.0 575.4 4764.7 5312.7 6230.7 384.7 373.2 458.9
Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%) – – – 11.0 3.3 2.9 – – 34.0
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) 2.6 4.0 4.7 20.5 11.9 10.9 7.7 7.8 6.7
Table 2
Sample characteristics by country and survey year.
Country Treated Attended school Missing Total
N % n % N %
Burkina Faso
1993 1637 21.3 2481 32.3 54 0.7 7683
1999 1486 20.2 1795 24.4 58 0.8 7349
2003 2987 21.4 3981 28.5 0 0 13950
2010 3401 19.3 8576 48.7 0 0 17611
Total 9511 20.4 16833 36.1 112 0.2 46593
Malawi
1992 1646 27.7 3989 67.2 13 0.2 5935
2000 3618 26 10811 77.7 38 0.3 13905
2004 3583 27 10525 79.3 0 0 13280
2010 7296 26.5 23335 84.8 58 0.2 27515
2015 5448 27 17614 87.1 0 0 20212
2016 2487 26.8 8193 88.2 0 0 9290
Total 24078 26.7 74467 82.6 109 0.1 90137
Colombia
1995 1057 11.6 6757 74.5 60 0.7 9075
2000 993 11.2 6553 73.8 27 0.3 8879
2005 3497 11.5 24555 80.5 0 0 30508
2010 4507 11.7 33126 85.8 0 0 38591
Total 10054 11.5 70991 81.5 87 0.1 87053
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used, and their sample sizes are given in Table 2 below. In Table 4, we
provide details of relevant policy changes in each country (see Fig. 2).
We present the results of our main analyses in Table 3. Increasing
the LMAW was associated with an increase of 2.0 (0.3, 3.7) percentage-
points in school attendance in Colombia. Similarly, the proportion of
Malawian children remaining in school increased by 3.0 (0.2, 5.7)
percentage-points. We found no evidence that the change in policy in
Burkina Faso had an effect on school attendance.
In Malawi, increasing the LMAWwas associated with a 4.4 (0.4, 8.5)
percentage-point increase in school attendance among girls, however
there was no change in attendance among boys. There was no differ-
ence in the effect of intervention on school attendance by gender in any
of the other countries. In Colombia, the policy-change increased school
attendance among the poorest tercile by 6.6 (2.6, 10.7) percentage-
points while it decreased attendance by 1.8 (0.1, 3.5) percentage-points
among the richest tercile. In Malawi, the middle wealth tercile saw a
5.6 (0.6, 10.5) percentage-point increase in school attendance. The
other wealth categories saw no effect of the policy. The effect of school
attendance did not vary by gender in the other countries.
We found that increasing the LMAW increased school attendance in
Colombia and Malawi but had no effect in Burkina Faso. In this respect,
our results differ from those of Boockmann (Boockmann, 2010), who
found no evidence of a difference in school attendance between coun-
tries who had ratified ILO convention 138 and those who had not (by
1990), and that age groups protected from work under ILO convention
138 were no more likely to attend school than those not affected by it.
Our findings are consistent with and deepen the cross-sectional results
by Heymann et al. examining the associational relationship between
child labor laws and secondary education rates at a national level
(Heymann et al., 2013). This finding affirms the need for international
conventions to be translated into national policy in order to have effect.
The effect of such national policy depends on local socio-economic
conditions. Burkina Faso, whose policy had no effect on school atten-
dance, suffers from high levels of poverty, and poor-quality educational
infrastructure due to chronic underinvestment in education. These
conditions impede the effective implementation of any educational or
labor policy. This reflects in the fact that, while basic education in
Burkina Faso is ostensibly free and compulsory, fewer than 30% of
children complete primary school (EPDC, 2014) and also, in spite of the
restrictions on child work, about 40% of 5–14 year-olds still work
(USDOL, 2016c).
Our findings support the importance of adequately-resourced en-
forcement mechanisms and regulatory capacity of for LMAW
restrictions to be effective. Malawi and Colombia, which saw positive
effects of their child labor policies on school attendance were ranked
54th and 80th respectively out of 113 countries in regulatory enforce-
ment, while Burkina Faso, which saw no effect is ranked 94th.
Institutional enforcement capacity is more difficult to measure and
tends to vary over time. Child labor regulatory bodies are however
generally under-resourced: in 2016 Colombia deployed 836 labour in-
spectors for a labour force size of 26 million people, while Burkina Faso
had 154 for 6.8 million and Malawi 141 for 8.8 million (USDOL,
2016b).
LMAW restrictions are often impeded in their effectiveness by the
fact that children mostly work in the informal economy, which tends to
resist regulation through formal mechanisms such as legal reform. This
notion is supported by a comparison of the relative sizes of the informal
economy in Colombia and Malawi (60.6% and 83% of the workforce
respectively) to that in Burkina Faso (94.6%) (International Labour
Office, 2018).
The magnitude of change proposed by the legal reforms in each
country may also have affected the observed impact. Malawi, which
made the biggest change in its policy (the LMAW went from none to
14), also saw the biggest impact. The effect of policy in Colombia may
have been limited by the fact that school attendance rates were already
quite high and thus could only rise minimally in response to the policy.
We found interestingly that the effect of the policy change on school
attendance was much greater among girls than boys in Malawi. This
could be due in part to socio-cultural changes placing greater value on
the education of girls (Coulombe & Canagarajah, 1999; Emerson &
Souza, 2007).
Household wealth is one of the strongest predictors of child work
and also a driver of educational outcomes (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003;
Carpio & Loayza, 2012; Deb & Rosati, 2002). It is possible that the
poorest in society would be the most affected by any intervention that
restricts child work since they are more likely to have children working.
It is also possible that the near-poor would be most affected, if the
poorest families are unable to forego child labor even when it is illegal.
We found that school attendance increased most for the poorest in
Colombia, a middle-income country, and the middle third in Malawi, a
low-income country. This difference may be due to family income
needs, different levels of enforcement and/or disparate sizes of the in-
formal economy.
It is worth noting that the successful limitation of legal work for
children, while benefitting education where there is compliance, may
deprive working children of legal protections where illegal child labor
Table 3
Effect of policy change on school attendance. Results presented as percentage-point change (95% confidence intervals). Values represent the absolute change
in proportion of age-qualified students attending school in the academic year before being surveyed.
Country Burkina Faso Colombia Malawi
All children −0.22 [-2.38, 1.95] 2.04 [0.34, 3.74] 2.99 [0.22, 5.76]
By gender
Boys −0.59 [-3.79, 2.6] 2.19 [-0.34, 4.72] 1.49 [-2.79, 5.77]
Girls 0.34 [-2.81, 3.48] 1.94 [-0.29, 4.18] 4.44 [0.43, 8.45]
Heterogeneity p-value <0.01 0.17 0.05
By wealth
Poorest −2.67 [-6.10, 0.75] 6.66 [2.6, 10.72] 2.8 [-2.47, 8.07]
Middle 1.14 [-2.84, 5.12] 2.72 [-0.42, 5.85] 5.57 [0.63, 10.52]
Richest 2.02 [-2.01, 6.04] −1.82 [-3.5, −0.14] 0.86 [-3.49, 5.2]
Heterogeneity p-value 0.32 < 0.01 0.08
O. Oppong-Nkrumah, et al. SSM - Population Health 8 (2019) 100426
5
continues. The elasticity of supply of child labor may depend on whe-
ther adult wages rise when child labor is eliminated or whether gov-
ernments provide more support to families in poverty as many poor
families are forced by economic considerations to choose the immediate
economic returns from a child working over the potentially higher fu-
ture economic returns from sending him/her to school (Carpio &
Loayza, 2012; Deb & Rosati, 2002; Bharadwaj, Lakdawala, & Li, 2013;
Fontana & Grugel, 2015).
Our study is limited by the nature of our data. Child workers, like
other disadvantaged populations, are notoriously difficult to capture in
the context of a research study like this. Working children are often
from the lowest socio-economic strata, especially in developing coun-
tries, and mostly work in informal settings. The work they do is not
always entirely legal, and they may be subject to exploitation. Thus,
child workers and their employers often avoid scrutiny, hampering any
efforts to gather accurate data on them. As a result, national surveys,
like the ones used, can provide the best data available. These surveys
are limited by self-reported outcomes and thus our study suffers from
the limitations associated with both these approaches. This limitation is
mitigated by good recall on major activities such as child labor and
attending school.
The difference-in-differences method used in this study accounts for
time-fixed confounders, both measured and unmeasured. It however
does not account for time-varying confounding, which could introduce
bias in the estimation of treatment effects if other changes occurred that
differentially affected some age groups (Lechner, 2011). By choosing a
within-country as opposed to cross-country analytical approach, we
hope to have mitigated the degree of time-varying confounding due to
country-specific factors.
Despite these limitations, our study benefited from the use of data
with multiple time-points allowing us to capture pre- and post-inter-
vention trends in greater detail as well as account for secular trends.
These strengthen our confidence in our inferences and conclusions from
the data.
In addition, this study benefited from the standardized intervention
definitions provided in the McGill PROSPERED Project's Child Labor
Policy Database.
3.1. Conclusion
We found evidence that increasing the minimum legal age of child
work had a positive effect on school attendance in 2 out of 3 countries.
Moreover, children at greater risk of being out of school tended to
benefit more. The International Labor Organization, ILO, and its part-
ners in their quest to eliminate child labor have pushed for countries to
enact legislation to limit child work even in the face of local opposition
(Fontana & Grugel, 2015). The results of this study suggest that in
addition to changing the LMAW, consideration must also be given to
providing effective implementation mechanisms for such legislation,
improving the socio-economic circumstances of poor households, and
improving access to, and quality of education.
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Appendix
Pre-intervention trends in school attendance by individual ages
Fig. 2. Pre-intervention trends in school attendance by age and country.
Pre-intervention trends in school attendance reported separately for affected ages, ages above affected age and ages below affected age
Fig. 3. Pre-intervention trends in school attendance by control group. 2
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Results for sensitivity analyses comparing different age ranges
Table 5
Effect of policy change on school attendance comparing different age ranges
Results presented as percentage-point change (95% confidence intervals). Values represent the absolute change in proportion of age-qualified students attending
school in the academic year before being surveyed.
Country Burkina Faso Colombia Malawi
Age 12–17 years Age 10–18 years Age 12–17 years Age 10–18 years Age 12–17 years Age 10–18 years
All children −0.13 [-2.30, 2.03] −0.22 [-2.38, 1.95] 1.97 [0.27, 3.67] 2.04 [0.34, 3.74] 3.00 [0.25, 5.75] 2.99 [0.22, 5.76]
By gender
Boys −0.46 [-3.62, 2.70] −0.59 [-3.79, 2.6] 2.07[-0.45, 4.60] 2.19 [-0.34, 4.72] 1.42 [-2.83, 5.68] 1.49 [-2.79, 5.77]
Girls 0.37 [-2.70, 3.49] 0.34 [-2.81, 3.48] 1.89 [-0.33, 4.10] 1.94 [-0.29, 4.18] 4.53 [0.51, 8.54] 4.44 [0.43, 8.45]
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2019.100426.
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